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Abstract
Given the amount of suffering in the world, do we have the capacity to provide the necessary
humanitarian assistance? Assuming that this is the case: are both the governments and the
populations willing to carry that burden in the future as they have done in the past? In order to
answer these interrelated questions accurately, we suggest the concept of capacity and will-
ingness as two constitutive elements of strategy design and we will sketch the framework in
which these strategies should be embedded. We assume, that both the capacity and willing-
ness to act in order to prevent and mitigate humanitarian disasters vary with respect to the
different risks enumerated. Accordingly, it is required to identify different types of disasters
and the specific risks associated with them. Following this survey strategies and their two
components, capacity and willingness, will be discussed by combining them with the types of
risks identified. This leads directly to identify the actors which should or could implement the
strategies. Lessons learned from past experience reveal that even though the capacity to act is
possibly underestimated the willingness to act is overestimated as far as the governmental
actors are con erned.
Zusammenfassung
Besteht vor dem Hintergrund weltweiter Katastrophen und des damit verbundenen Leidens
die Fähigkeit der notwendigen humanitären Hilfe? Und wenn dem so ist, besitzen sowohl die
Regierungen als auch die Gesellschaften die Bereitschaft, weiterhin die Lasten bzw. Kosten
dieser humanitären Politik zu tragen? Um diese Fragen angemessen beantworten zu können,
wird das Zwillingskonzept von Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft vorgestellt, zwei konstitutive El-
mente politischer Strategien bezüglich der humanitären Hilfe wie auch der Prävention. Es
wird angenommen, daß die Fähigkeit und die Bereitschaft des Handelns entsprechend der
Katastrophen und der damit verbundenen Risiken variieren. Folgerichtig müssen sowohl die
unterschiedlichen Katastrophen als auch die damit einhergehenden Risiken identifiziert wer-
den. Dies führt dann in einem weiteren Schritt zur Frage, welche Akteure mit welchen Pro-
blemen konfrontiert sind und wie sich spezifische Strategien bezüglich der Bewältigung von
Not implementieren lassen. Die Erfahrung der Vergangenheit deutet darauf hin, daß die Fä-
higkeit zum Handeln möglicherweise unterschätzt wird, während gleichzeitig die Bereitschaft
zur humanitären Hilfe und Prävention, zumindest der Regierungen, eher überschätzt wird.
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11. Is suffering inevitable?1
Given the amount of suffering in the world, do we have the capacity to provide the
necessary humanitarian assistance? Assuming that this is the case: are both the govern-
ments and the populations willing to carry that burden in the future as they have done in
the past? The capacity for humanitarian assistance is considerable. In light of the huge
sums that have been spent over the past years the willingness to provide disaster relief
seems beyond any doubt. But this is only part of the truth. Are all human disasters in-
evitable? The answer is clearly no. In some cases, the will to act is obviously limited.
According to Hendrickson (1998:10) “the strategic rationale for aid has increasingly
been linked to the disengagement from crisis regions by richer countries and to the
adoption of policies which [...] seek to contain the crisis”. That means that a negative
correlation exists between the political willingness to deal with the causes of disasters,
which has declined, and the political will to deal with their effects, i. e. the humanitarian
disasters themselves, which have increased.
Against this background, the problem of political strategies and operational space
can not be dealt with properly unless we have clarified first what the purpose of de-
signing strategies is or should be. If the starting point are the humanitarian disasters
themselves, this option necessarily leads to what we may call a managerial approach.
Under these conditions humanitarian disasters are conceptually and substantively iso-
lated from the political and social context in which they occur. If in contrast humanitar-
ian disasters are primarily viewed as a failure of politics, strategies must address the
causes as well. In this case we speak of a political pproach to international order and
stability. Obviously such an approach incorporates conceptually humanitarianism (rep-
resented by the humanitarian organizations) with international politics (power relations
and norms regulating the behavior of states and non-state actors).
                                         
1 This paper is part of the ongoing project on the “Politics of Humanitarian Aid”, financed by the Deut-
sche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
2In the following paper strategies are understood as means for risk reduction. If their
design is more than a purely intellectual exercise one has to take into account both the
capacity as well as the willingness of the actors to reduce risks in a given policy field.
The international humanitarian relief system comprises two sets of actors we assume to
be complementary: governmental and nongovernmental actors. Complementarity im-
plies by definition role complementarity. Thus, the strategies must logically be com-
plementary as well. Complementarity is reflected in the division of labor between the
governmental and nongovernmental actors. To simplify matters one can argue that the
role of the role of the former is primarily related to the maintenance of international
order and stability whereas the role of the latter is the delivery of humanitarian relief.
That includes both the prevention of political disasters on the one hand, the support and
protection of humanitarian assistance on the other.
In our paper we will first sketch the framework in which strategies should be em-
bedded. In a next step we will outline the different types of disasters and the specific
risks associated with them. Following this survey strategies and their two components,
capacity and willingness, will be discussed by combining them with the types of risks
identified. This discussion will lead us directly to identify the actors which should or
could implement the strategies. We will finally briefly review the capacity and willing-
ness to act from the vantage point of the framework developed and identify the critical
elements for the strategy design.
2. Strategies for what?
The goal of humanitarian assistance is to bring relief to individuals who find them-
selves in a life threatening situation they cannot overcome by themselves. The guiding
principles of this activity are neutrality, impartiality, and independence. These princi-
ples have led to the characterization of humanitarian assistance as an unpolitical activ-
ity. This is true to the extent that the victim is the exclusive focus. Whoever finds her-
self or himself in a life threatening situation such as famine, an epidemic, or armed con-
3flict is entitled to help. This ind vidualistic perspective legitimizes the existence and
activities of the humanitarian organizations wherever a disaster occurs. The question in
this case is not why a disaster took place but rather how to overcome as quickly as pos-
sible human suffering. Yet this perspective is in omplete.
The complementary view is what we have called a collective perspective. The phi-
losopher Luc Ferry (1996:126) has formulated this point of view as follows: “... sur le
plan politique (emphasis in the orig.), elle (l’action humanitaire, WDE/SC) traduit
l’exigence d’une solidarité avec l’humanité entière...”. One particular human right has
bridged the gap between this philanthropic philosophy and politics as far as humanitari-
anism is concerned: the right to life. This particular human right is truly universal and at
the same time ideologically and politically neutral. From the moral or normative stand-
point this collective perspective implies both entitlements and obligations. The victim is
unconditionally entitled to relief. The obligation is to provide not only relief but the
obligation to guarantee this right as well. The latter is not a specific humanitarian issue
but the most basic principle of any system of international governance worth that name.
The political issue is therefore how risks can be reduced with respect to the occurrence
of disasters as well as their consequences. If humanitarian disasters can not be prevented
the obligation is to reduce both the damage and the ensuing consequences.
The preliminary conclusion is that political strategies in this particular policy field
should focus both on the capacity and willingness to prevent humanitarian disasters, to
guarantee relief if they are unavoidable, and to prevent follow-up political disasters if
possible. The first and the third aspect reveal that humanitarian disasters must be con-
ceptually be embedded in a broader political framework.
43. Disasters: Types and Risks
The objects of prevention and relief are the different kinds of disasters, their actual
or potential consequences. We define a disaster simply as an event with a high prob-
ability to cause human and/or material losses in a given geographical area (Eber-
wein/Chojnacki, 1998:9). This is the most parsimonious definition we can think of. It
limits disasters to a group of people, unable to avoid its immediate impact. The defin-
tion avoids any reference to the ability of a community or the society at large to deal
with the consequences. In contrast to other definitions provided by the International
Federation of the Red Cross or the former UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs our
disaster definition has omitted vulnerability as a constitutive element. Vulnerability is a
complex concept which caries with it a variety of connotations. It is both a property of
the disaster (occurrence and damage) and the risk a particular community of people is
exposed to should a disaster occur. The latter notion emphasizes the societal and/or po-
litical context. From the analytical point of view vulnerability can be conceptualized as
a contextual property of disaster occurrence and diffusion. This leads to the assumption
that disasters of any kind are more likely to have disruptive effects within vulnerable
states.
Two types of disasters can be distinguished: natural disasters and human made dis-
asters.2 This dimension can be combined with a second one, their duration: short term
vs. long term. Combining these two dimensions gives us four types of disasters. We
have used this typology based upon the data collection by CRED (cf. Sapir, 1991),
adding on to them human made disasters that are related to violence, i. e. interstate
military conflicts and wars as well as domestic violence or wars of the third kind, as
Holsti (1996) calls them, from other sources (Eberwein/Chojnacki, 1998).3 The various
types are listed in Table 1.
                                         
2 We are well aware of the fact that this distinction is not as straightforward as it seems. In particular the
causes of disasters may vary. So called natural disasters may be caused by human behavior and vice
versa, i. e. draughts by global climate change and violence as a consequence of a drought. Neverthe-
less this distinction makes sense in that it directly and exclusively refers to the event itself and its ori-
gin.
3 The description can be found in Eberwein/Chojnacki (1998:17-25).
5Table 1: Types of Disasters
Short-Term Natural Short-Term Human Made
Geological Origin
(e.g. earthquake, landslide,
volcano,
avalanche, tsunami)
Accidents
(e.g. technical disasters)
Hydro-Meteorological Origin
(extreme weather, high winds,
floods)
Chemical accidents
Nuclear accidents
Long-Term Natural Long-Term Human Made
Epidemic diseases Famine, Food shortage
Insect infestations
Droughts
Interstate conflicts
Domestic violence
Given the issue of disaster occurrence every society is confronted with different
kinds of risks. We simply define risk as the probability of an event to occur. This is
what we call risk 1. There are additional types of risks, however. We define risk 2 as the
probability of human or material damage associated with a particular type of disaster.
These two types of risks can relatively easy be evaluated for short term-disasters. They
are limited events which occur only once or at least within a fairly short period of time.
If the duration of long-term disasters were predetermined this would pose no problem.
But their duration is a function of the behavior or the reaction response of the people
involved. When World War I started the political and military leaders in Europe be-
lieved that it would be a short war. But that war lasted several years which was not in-
tended by any of the parties involved. Vicious action-reaction cycles led to the unin-
tended and murderous outcomes. Thus, in the case of violence, the risk that this will
lead to the intensification of fighting among groups or of groups against the population
is always present, i. e. an escalatory process. This is what we call risk 3.4
                                         
4 In the literature one usually defines thresholds of violence. Bremer (1996) for example, has developed
such a model for the study of war. This means that risk 3 actually encompasses an equal number of
probabilities, one for each of the thresholds identified. This makes conceptually sense because conflict
processes are not continuous but determined by a series of discrete events.
6We can identify an additional risk 4 which indicates the probability that even a
small event like a bad harvest ends leads to another disaster, say a violent conflict about
scarce renewable resources (cf. Homer-Dixon, 1994). Finally, we are left with a type of
risk which is often overlooked, namely the probability that one disaster or a whole se-
ries of disasters threaten regional if not international stability, a risk which we have
called risk 5. This particular risk bridges the conceptual gap between humanitarianism
and international security. The relationship among them is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1:
Types of Risk from a Process Perspective
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Ideally a political strategy should include means to deal with each of these interre-
lated risks. As we will argue below, political disasters lead to humanitarian disasters and
these, in turn may have longer term destabilizing political consequences, intranationally
as well as internationally. What about the capacity and willingness of the actors to deal
with these risks? This issue we will address next.
74. Capacity to Act
The capacity to act is dependent on two kinds of resources, tangible resources such
as money, equipment, and personnel, and intangible resources, primarily knowledge and
skills. Both determine the degree to which political strategies for the prevention of,
and/or relief in, humanitarian crises, reflect the capacity to do so. Tangible resources,
such as peace enforcement troops for example, are a necessary condition for the capac-
ity to act, yet as the disaster in Somalia showed the knowledge and skills as a sufficient
condition for that capacity to be effectiv ly used was lacking.
We will ignore in the further discussion the tangible aspect and focus on the intan-
gible part of it. Knowledge is useful on three accounts. First, knowledge contributes to
explain the occurrence of an event and identifies its causes. Second, if we can explain it
we should also be able to predict its occurrence or at least be able to determine the
probability of its occurrence. Prediction, however, does by no means imply also pre-
vention in the more direct meaning, simply because we cannot prevent an earthquake
from occurring. In other words, there are predictable events which can also be prevented
whereas others can not. Prevention should not be limited conceptually to merely avoid
the occurrence of an event. Prevention should also encompass the limitation of risks
which, if nothing is done, could increase. Inactivity in the case of an earthquake or a
drought would certainly increase the loss of lives. Natural disasters can not be prevented
but predicted, human made disasters can in principle be prevented even though there are
problems with the prediction (cf. below).
Conceptually, we have to combine the different risks identified with the elements
strategies should focus on: prevention (which includes all the risks one to five), and
relief (risks 2, 3 and 4). This will give us at least some first plausible assumptions about
the capacity to act in terms of knowledge and skills.
Risk 1: With respect to risk 1 even though lacking the necessary special knowledge
we can safely assume that both long-term and short-term natural disasters can be pre-
dicted relatively accurately within reasonable bounds. But these predictions do not al-
low the prevention of natural disasters. With respect to human made disasters risk esti-
mates abound about technical accidents, i. e. of nuclear power plants. How accurate
8these are is another matter. Even if they were we can still not predict the time when a
nuclear accident would happen. To say that a nuclear accident is likely to occur only
once every 10,000 years is almost meaningless. There is hardly any real possibility to
prevent accidents such as Bhopal, Seveso or Chernobyl. Quite different is the situation
with respect to long-term human made disasters. With respect to interstate violence we
have some rough insights as to the causes of interstate conflict, about the escalation of
military conflicts, the outbreak of war and the widening of wars. The same is true with
respect to domestic violence, in particular genocide and politicide, one of the results
from the Minorities at Risk project by Gurr and Harff (1998). There is also some good
information about famines (Macrae/Zwi, 1994). And if we believe in the models on
global warming we know that some parts of the world will increasingly be subject to
droughts.
Risk 2: With respect to risk 2 we do have some estimates as to the lethality of short
term natural disasters. The damage can be prevented in the sense of reducing the lethal-
ity of these kinds of events, as the work done among others by the International Decade
for Natural Disaster reduction shows (cf. DFG, 1993). For short term human made dis-
asters knowledge as how to reduce the damage is available as well (including early
warning and preparedness). Whether and how that knowledge is implemented is another
matter. The crucial issue for this kind of particular risk relates to the long-term disasters,
both natural and human made. The best one could probably say is that given past expe-
rience we know the conditional probability that risk 2 increases with inaction, especially
in vulnerable societies. In this particular case risk is to a large extent determined by the
institutional setting, the behavior of the political authorities, the humanitarian actors and
the people directly and indirectly affected by the disaster, i. e. a famine when it begins
or communal violence when it erupts. In general we assume that a negative correlation
exists between the reaction speed of the humanitarian relief operations, the required
quantity and quality of relief reaction and the damage incurred.
Risk 3: This particular risk indicates the escalatory probability of longer-term hu-
man made and natural disasters. The duration of a drought can hardly be influenced, but
that of both famines and violence can be. Neither on logical nor on empirical grounds
can we argue that famines must be as lethal and as enduring as they are, nor that vio-
9lence must spread or intensify as it has in the past and in the present. In that sense risk 3
consists conceptually of several conditional probabilities if we take a threshold model of
disaster for granted. Such processes are determined by discrete steps, decisions and ac-
tions, by the parties involved (Bremer, 1996).
What about knowledge and skills? As far as famines are concerned there are studies
which describe in some details the dynamics of this escalatory process (cf. Macrae/Zwi,
1994). As far as the dynamics of violence is concerned we do have a whole array of
conceptual models, some of which have been empirically tested (cf. Gurr/Harff, 1998).
There also is the excellent five volume report among others about Rwanda (cf. Eriks-
son,1996). Whether and how that knowledge from specific cases can actually be trans-
ferred to a higher level of generality is probably worth a research project of its own.
Taking the prevention literature at face value the answer would be yes. Looking at the
systematic empirical literature, it seems that we know more than we sometimes pretend
to know (cf. among others Bercovitch, 1998). Unless the combined political and hu-
manitarian reactivity to potential longer-term disasters is low, not only will damage i-
crease but also the probability that a particular disaster will intensify or escala .
Risk 4: Turning to risk 4, that is the probability that one disaster, either natural or
human made, triggers another disaster, either human made or natural, we must confess
that we are at loss. We do not know of any systematic empirical research of this par-
ticular issue. Do natural disasters trigger human made disasters? Or, do human made
disasters lead to natural disasters (i. e. destruction of the eco-system)?5 According to our
initial research at best a weak relationship seems to exist between natural an human
made disasters. We know from Gurr/Harff that political disasters such as a political re-
gime change may trigger another one, leading to what is usually called complex emer-
gencies implying violence against civilians if not genocide. In general some information
is available, but as it is quantitative it hardly ever gets acknowledged outside the quan-
titatively oriented research community.
                                         
5 See among others the analysis by Brock (1995), also Käkonen (1994).
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Risk 5: This particular risk intends to identify the impact of disasters on regional or
international stability. Our capacity to act in terms of knowledge is not necessarily as
limited as it seems. But as the case of Kosovo shows the dynamics of the process can
lead to unintended and undesired results depending on how the various parties involved
act and react. This we will find out fairly soon. The impact, however, can only be
guessed or “guestimated”. That there is one, can be illustrated with two examples. First,
the ongoing slaughter in Algeria, which threatens not only the regional stability in the
Maghreb but also has already had some destabilizing impact within France. Second, the
Kurd issue which has had, and might possibly have further consequences not only in
Turkey but also in Germany. It is obvious that this particular type of risk is not primar-
ily humanitarian in nature even though the consequences could be. In general, the ca-
pacity to act is difficult to assess in this particular domain.
As this very brief overview reveals each particular risk consists of a combination of
capacities in terms of knowledge and skills. Capacity to act is at the same time not just
humanitarian in nature, but to a large degree political. Some of it is clearly preventive in
nature, related to preparedness and early warning. Some of the risks (particularly 1, 4
and 5) are clearly outside the humanitarian realm proper, whereas with respect to risks 2
and 3 both humanitarian and political preventive as well as reactive responses are r-
quired.
5. The Political Context
Thus far we have ignored the political context in which disasters take place, thereby
implicitly assuming that the core problem is the disaster itself. This is obviously wrong.
First, the context clearly determines both the capacity and willingness to act. Humani-
tarian assistance is intended to help not only the victims unable to help themselves, as
Brauman (1995) says, but by logical implication the societies where disasters occur
which are as well presumed to be, or actually are incapable of, helping themselves. Hu-
11
manitarian assistance is therefore by definition an intervention into the domestic affairs
of a third state.6 This humanitarian intervention poses no problem as long as all the par-
ties involved, donor and recipient states on the one hand, humanitarian organizations
and populations on the other, agree. It poses no problem either, when the humanitarian
environment or what is sometimes called the humanitarian space (cf. Pilar, 1999) is
uncontested and safe.
The problematic cases are those where domestic and/or international violence is in-
volved, that is, where relief organizations are directly active in a violent political and
social environment. There is no simple answer to this problem if there is one at all.
Violence in general, domestic violence in particular, is most likely to occur in vulner-
able societies. Vulnerable societies can be defined as unstable political social systems
characterized by high inequality, political and social cleavages, a relatively low level of
development and the absence of stable political and social institutions (cf. Buzan, 1991;
Holsti, 1991). Two consequences result. One is that any disaster can upset the fragile
balance of forces in a vulnerable society and end in violence. Second, humanitarianism
gets trapped in a dilemma: under these conditions humanitarian assistance is also a po-
tential if not actual asset manipulated by the warring parties. In other words, where most
needed relief is either limited, or misused.
Let us briefly look at  the empirical evidence: the distribution of human made dis-
asters related to violence. As can be seen from Table 2 most disruptive disasters, human
made disasters in terms of internal and international violence, occur and persist in those
regions of the world which are populated by these vulnerable states.7 These are the
problematic cases where major problems related to the political and the humanitarian
function of disaster relief arises. This issue of vulnerability goes back to the structure of
the international system and the new order created after 1945.
                                         
6 We do not use the term intervention in the legal meaning as laid out in article 2.7 of the UN-Charter,
but rather as a matter of fact statement.
7 Even though we do not present an empirical measure of that we do have the information which allows
the construction of such indicators. Some are available such as the Human Deprivation Indices pub-
lished in the Human Development Reports.
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Table 2: Regional Distribution of Civil War Years and
Occurrence of International Disputes, 1946-92
Region Domestic War-Years International Disputes and Wars
N (%) N (%)
North America - - 54 (3,7)
Central America 46 (8,8) 59 (4,0)
South America 44 (8,5) 73 (5,0)
Western Europe - - 107 (7,3)
Eastern Europe 11 (2,1) 57 (3,9)
Russia/Central Asia 33 (6,3) 81 (5,5)
North Africa 7 (3,1) 74 (5,0)
East Africa 50 (13,1) 73 (5,0)
Central Africa 28 (5,4) 34 (2,3)
West Africa 13 (2,5) 41 (2,8)
Southern Africa 43 (11,0) 57 (3,9)
Middle East 53 (10,2) 358 (24,3)
South Asia 68 (13,1) 113 (7,7)
Southeast Asia 47 (9,0) 260 (17,7)
Oceania 33 (6,9) 31 (2,1)
Total 520 (100,0) 1472 (100,0)
Source: Correlates of War Project (for details see Eberwein/Chojnacki, 1998)
The problematic states where these kind of human disasters occur are weak or
quasi-states as Jackson (1990) calls them. They lack the attribute of positive sover-
eignty. This means that in accordance with the UN-Charter and the international order
as established in the wake of World War II (cf. Holsti, 1996) that these weak states are
bearers of rights, among others the fundamental right to be protected from foreign inter-
vention. Being unable to do so by themselves, the states in the international system have
the obligation to guarantee that right according to the UN-Charter. In principle these
“sovereign” governments have all the rights but their populations have none. Sover-
eignty under this regime means the protection of the territorial integrity of states domi-
nated by weak if not corrupt or even criminal power holders. And this means that at
least a certain number of recipient states can manipulate humanitarian relief activities,
prevent protective actions by the international community or even bar access to the vic-
tims if nongovernmental and governmental organizations do not comply with their de-
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mands.8 As long as the international community does not in general accept, even less
enforce the right to life as a fundamental norm of state behavior, so-called humanitarian
intervention will remain embedded within the classical power political framework.
Strategic or humanitarian interests dominate, thereby also delegitimizing to some extent
not only state humanitarianism but also potentially the role of humanitarian organiza-
tions themselves. Humanitarianism of the 19th century intended to “humanize” war
making, the problem today is to humanize, so to speak, global society at large by pro-
tecting civilians as actual and potential victims. Such a new humanitarian international
order already found its expression in the two UN General Assembly Resolutions 43/130
from 1988 and 45/100 from 1990 (cf. Bettaty, 1995; Domestici-Met, 1996), where the
order issue fundamentally boils down to the question: is there a (human) right of the
victim for relief? That would force the states to guarantee and to enforce this human
right where ncessary. We will come back to that issue later.
6. The Willingness to Act
Crucial for political strategies in any policy field is the willingness to act which pre-
supposes the capacity to do so. Let us assume that the required capacity to act is given.
In an article published recently in Foreign Affairs David (1999:104) writes that
„many now argue that the United States should turn its back on these internal
squabbles. These civil wars, they argue, are the domestic affairs of poor, weak
countries, not important enough to merit American involvement. Getting en-
meshed in complicated disputes and age-old hatreds will sap American re-
sources - and for no good reason“.
He continues by saying that
„being unintended, the spill-over effects of civil wars are not easily deterred,
which creates unique challenges to American interests ... Without deterrence as
                                         
8 Very instructive is the case of the South Sudanese rebels. Originally the US supported the Sudanese
Government against them. With Karthoum turning toward the Islamic fundamentalist camp they
found themselves supported by the US, notwithstanding their left background (Prunier, 1996).
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a policy option, Washington loses its most effective means of safeguarding its
interests” (op. cit. 105).
This short citation helps to clarify the willingness issue. From the state actors’ per-
spective humanitarian disasters in general, violence in particular, is first and foremost a
foreign policy respectively an international security issue. This is why David - quite
rightly so - speaks of deterrence and not of humanitarianism. The lacking willingness to
act is therefore a lack of appreciation of the political consequences of humanitarian dis-
asters which are themselves the consequence of political ones. Quite the opposite can be
postulated for the humanitarian organizations. Their willingness to act can be taken for
granted, it is their raison d’être and oganization survival.
We briefly review the various risks and then suggest a few propositions as to the
willingness to act. That disposition depends on the one part from the international sys-
tem of order which in the end legitimizes the impunity with the perpetration of the most
basic humanitarian standards by reference to state sovereignty. It depends to a large
degree as well on the willingness to humanize, so to speak the prevailing international
order, among others through International Humanitarian Law, its modification and its
enforcement
Risk 1: In the last decade preventive diplomacy has become a growth industry, in
terms of concepts, in terms of governmental institutions and NGOs9, and in terms of
declaratory policy. Thereby one overlooks the fact, that prevention is what diplomacy in
general is all about. The specific results achieved with this new approach (cf. Wallen-
steen, 1998) are less convincing. Many cases, Rwanda or Kosovo, to mention but two,
reveal the lack of willingness on the part of the state community to engage actively in
preventive diplomacy. There is no such thing, we would argue, as a humanitarian pre-
ventive diplomacy, but just preventive diplomacy proper. To focus just on the preven-
tion of humanitarian disasters as such is ineffective. The focus should not be the h-
manitarian disaster as the consequence but rather the causes themselves, rooted in the
                                         
9 A good example is the 1998 International Directory on the Prevention and Management of Violent
Conflicts edited by the European Platform for Conflict Prevention, PIOOM and the Berghof Research
Institute. It includes about 750 institutions active in this area.
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political, social, environmental and economic conditions. For humanitarian NGOs pre-
vention falls neither within their domain of competence nor do they have that capacity.10
Risk 2: With respect to this particular risk the willingness to act is high from the
humanitarian organizations’ perspective, selective from the governments’ point of view.
The problem with some humanitarian organizations seems to be that they clearly over-
estimate their capacity to act. Politically, selectivity is not necessarily determined by
humanitarian concerns but by strategic considerations as some humanitarian disasters
go widely unnoticed or do not get the required attention whereas others do get more
than required. In that respect willingness is subject to exogenous influences, primarily
the media which play a crucial role in activating this particular disposition of the politi-
cal actors.
Risk 3: Unless political issues are at stake we could argue that the willingness to act
on the part of the interstate system is even lower, in that involvement entails additional
incalculable risks. This is not the case if in fact strategic interests play a role. Under
these conditions the humanitarian involvement, if not humanitarian intervention by the
state actors can either be used to legitimize military involvement or to legitimize the
reluctance to deal with the political causes proper. This is one of the reasons why hu-
manitarian organizations, willing to act, are often left alone, not getting the political
support required to perform their role. Their willingness to act decreases with the in-
creasing danger for the victims and the volunte rs.
Risk 4: We do not have any evidence by and large which would allow us to formu-
late a well grounded proposition. Our assumption nevertheless is that even though po-
tential linkages between various disasters are perceived and acknowledged, i. e. re-
source scarcity which indicates gradual degradation such as water, that could lead to
humanitarian disasters at a later point. We are confronted to some degree with a lack of
capacity, even more so with respect to the willingness to act preventively.
                                         
10 We will not raise the issue as to the role of the various NGOs involved in peace making- mediation
and- as some call it today, peace transformation and peace building. That would merit a separate stu-
dy.
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Risk 5: As the discussion about environment and security suggests (cf. among oth-
ers Eberwein, 1998) there is widespread disagreement as to whether environmental deg-
radation is a security issue at all. But disasters of any sort are potentially security issues,
thus both domestic instabilities and violence should be included in a reconceptualization
of what is still understood as national security or the national interest. The way gov-
ernments deal with humanitarian disasters suggests that they either refrain to act from
the outset or that they assume they can be contained. The willingness to act will i-
crease with the awareness that a political disaster can in fact lead to a diffusion effect.
The problem is that once this is perceived to be the case the capacity to act has already
decreased.
7. Actors, Roles, and Strategies
We can finally address the question of strategies. As we have argued, a core as-
sumption relates to the complementarity of roles, implying specific responsibilities and
specific competencies to deal with humanitarian disasters themselves, their causes and
consequences. Complementarity can take on various forms. If the donors are to a great
extent government agencies (including international organizations) and link resource
allocation with specific conditions, we have what we call state dominance. If, however,
the humanitarian organizations are independent in their freedom of action by their do-
nors we speak of s cietal dominance. If both operate on the level of parity we can speak
of functional complementarity or parity.
How is the international humanitarian system structured and how should it be
structured? Unfortunately there is no clear answer to the first issue. There are, however,
some indications that we are dealing with a partially fragmented system. We have nu-
merous NGOs all of them competing in this particular service sector on the donor side
(Simmons, 1998). This enhances to some extent state dominance in this particular field.
That poses problems on the recipient side as well (cf. Anderson, 1998). Second, we also
have concentration tendencies in terms of networks among humanitarian NGOs which
point toward oligopolistic tendencies on this market, where some of the larger ones
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seem to be exclusive in nature (cf. Topçu, 1999). This is a kind of partial societal dom-
nance. There is, third, a tendency of partial parity in the sense that some larger groups
have easier access to political decision makers with a tendency to operate either as
quasi-governmental actors or are becoming an integral part of the political decision-
making structures (cf. Jean, 1998). This latter case amounts to partial collusion. Finally,
we do have what one could call multifunctionality by combining roles and functions of
relief activities with human rights, development, and mediation/peace keeping/peace
building.
It seems that parity is less prevalent than a mixture of state dominance and societal
dominance including the loss of identity of humanitarian relief. That means that hu-
manitarianism is a politicized process, to some extent due to state appropriation of this
particular policy field and which tends to be reinforced by the NGO movement at large.
The victim turns into a multifunctional object of activity. Is that desirable? We would
argue that it is not. We do argue in favor of the parity type of model, even though the
following arguments are only a rough first sketch of that concept.11 How should roles
and functions be defined and why? Humanitarian disasters are primarily political fail-
ures reflecting shortcomings of the international order. Relief is just one - of many -
elements related to a particular conception of international order. The underlying norm
should be to safeguard respectively restore the right to life. From the government per-
spective humanitarian politics is therefore security policy in the larger meaning of the
term. As such a political humanitarian strategy is therefore a subset of security policy: if
international norms are violated there must be collective agreement to enforce their ac-
ceptance. But humanitarian politics should not be confounded with humanitarian as-
sistance proper. In other words both areas of activity are distinct and need to be kept
separate. But at the same time they are interdependent (cf. OECD, 1998). Isolating hu-
manitarian assistance conceptually from security policy subordinates it in practice to
power politics: politics can act under the banner of humanitarianism which undermines
the impartiality of humanitarian at large, and also particularly in the field. Humanitarian
assistance may be perceived as a party to an ongoing conflict. Thus, conceptually and in
                                         
11 We hope to ground our inferences on an empirical analysis which is underway right now. We will also
elaborate the conceptual framework that relates to the notion of international institu ions and order.
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practice we have to distinguish sharply between relief proper, usually administered by
the humanitarian organizations, and the conditions of victimization as well as the con-
ditions in the disaster area where relief workers operate, primarily protection of poten-
tial and actual victims as well as access and security. Humanitarian politics in that sense
includes first and foremost the prevention of the conditions that lead to suffering.
Going back to Figure 1 we can identify four specific domains of strategies related to
the specific risks identified. With respect to risk 1, the occurrence of disasters, is from
our vantage point, primarily an issue of international order. As crucial as human rights
are in general, the minimal standard to achieve would be the compliance with the hu-
man right to life and its enforcement in particular. In principle that human right should
be the least controversial. The consequence is that international humanitarian law needs
to incorporate explicitly the right of the victim to relief (cf. Dom nici, 1996). We are
well aware that the barriers to such a strategy are formidable because they directly affect
the still prevailing notion of sovereignty. Nevertheless this should not exclude preven-
tion. With respect to the second circle, damage, the strategy to pursue would have to be
one which supports humanitarian relief and provides the necessary guarantees if not
relief enforcement. This directly touches upon the access and protection issues. This is
primarily a role of the state actors, a derivative of their responsibility for international
order. The problem is how to avoid militarized humanitarianism. With respect to the
third circle, the escalation process, again, is not a humanitarian issue as such, it is a po-
litical issue which, again is directly related to crisis management, prevention and me-
diation. The fourth circle, namely the prevention of horizontal escalation, one disaster
triggering another, is also an issue primarily related to the political domain, which also
holds for the last and final risk, namely the consequences for international stability and
also, which should not be forgotten, global governance at large.
How could we define the core elements of strategy design for the nongovernmental
organizations? The role of the humanitarian organizations is relief proper, independ-
ently, impartially and neutrally. The notion of “independence” is slightly ambiguous
since it implies nothing but the postulate that any humanitarian organization is entitled
to do what it wants to do. Legitimacy and acceptability of impartial, independent and
neutral action can only be maintained if it is so. Any activity is legitimate as long as the
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focus is the victim. Any activity which has no clear finality, such as peace-building,
democratization or development is neither impartial, independent nor neutral. Thus
functional transgressions, so to speak, need to be avoided in order to maintain credibil-
ity towards the donors and credibility towards the recipients.
Looking at Figure 1 there is indeed a preventive function for humanitarian organi-
zations with respect to risk 1. One should probably call it preparedness (or even better:
early warning ability) rather than prevention. This function overlaps with the one related
to risk 2 which includes a high level of professionalization, individually and organiza-
tionally such as recruitment and adequate training of volunteers, logistics and the re-
sponsibility of the organizations for their staff in the field before and after their specific
missions. With respect to risk 3 advocacy for the victims (both against perpetrators in
the recipient country as well as against the inactivity of the inter-state system at large)
as well as the capacity to mediate among the conflicting parties on the site are additional
functions to complement the role of the humanitarian organizations. There is hardly any
particular role for humanitarian organizations proper as far as risk 4 is concerned.
This implies a revision or extension of the notion that humanitarian organizations
are exponents of civil society. As transnationally operating organizations they do not fit
into the classic mould of civil society (cf. Götze, 1998). Their legitimacy derives from
the fact that their activity is indicative of political failure, within and between states.
Legitimacy however has its price. One of the prices to pay is accountability. One ele-
ment of that is the adherence to a code of conduct. Added on to this self restraint is the
accountability towards the donors, the recipient countries and the public. This raises
problems because humanitarian organizations are also service organizations. Finally,
accountability also includes transparency of the resource management and allocation
because the resources are donations or public subsidies.12 Competitiveness should not
be measured exclusively in terms of success in fund raising and organizational size, but
also and primarily so, in terms of the success to provide relief most efficiently.
                                         
12 According to Siméant (1998) some humanitarian organizations have developed quite effective strate-
gies of “innovative bookkeeping”
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8. Capacity and Willingness? - Evaluation and Outlook
One could well argue that the arguments that have been presented are fundame-
tally idealistic. That may well be true in the sense that they certainly do not reflect real-
ity. Rather reality seems to be quite different, to put it bluntly, but we do not have the
space to elaborate the argument:
First, humanitarianism has to some extent become a political means in its own right,
thereby detracting from the basic issue, namely from the issue of international order,
stability and humanity. Second, competitiveness has increased which has strengthened
considerably the role of the donors in general, the states’ influence on the other. Third,
the humanitarian role seems to become increasingly blurred by burdening it with issues
of peacemaking, peacebuilding, mediation or development. That is, the politicization of
humanitarian assistance is evident.
Our so-called idealistic approach to create a hum nitarian space.13  This construct
has a semantic dimension in that it must be clear what humanitarian politics and hu-
manitarian assistance are. It has a clear geographical dimension which relates to the
specific area where relief is actually delivered. And it has finally a conceptual dimen-
sion referring to humanitarian norms and their being generally accepted as part of the
international order as such. This not only includes the formalization in protocols, trea-
ties and conventions but also the adherence to these norms and their enforcement. This
latter idea has been inspired by the emergence of other norms in the international sys-
tem. The international order is not static but changing and that order is always norm
based (sovereignty being an outstanding example). A perfect example of this is the abo-
lition of slavery (cf. Ray, 1990). The social movement active in this respect emerged in
the early nineteenth century. Only by the end of that century was slavery finally abol-
ished and part of international law. Why was that movement successful? One of the
reasons is that this particular norm was specific and, due to normative entrepreneurs, its
diffusion was finally institutionalized (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink, 1998). The right to life
has just those properties: it is specific and potentially universally acceptable.
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Our understanding of designing political strategies is therefore based upon a notion
of complementarity of roles of humanitarian and political actors. They need each other
which means to acknowledge their interlocking functions. Nevertheless their roles must
remain specific and separate, visible to all and distinct.
Both the capacity and willingness to act in order to prevent and mitigate humani-
tarian disasters vary with respect to the different risks enumerated. Lessons learned
from past experience reveal that even though the capacity to act is possibly underesti-
mated the willingness to act is overestimated as far as the governmental actors are con-
cerned. It seems that the opposite holds to some extent for the nongovernmental actors
as a result of the “unbound humanitarianism”. This seems to be problematic in light of
the fact that the coming century will very likely not be more peaceful. Disasters will
continue to occur, some countries will probably continue to fall apart and some groups
will continue to use violence as a means or for its own sake. And that means more vic-
tims!
                                                                                                          
13 From the context it is clear that it is primarily a social construct, as the constructivists would argue, or
a general concept which is useful to derive specific attributes characterizing that “space” in practice.
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